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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I examine the political philosophy of B. Ackerman and in particular his 
conception of neutrality. I argue that in his  philosophy of dialogue neutrality has a 
central place because it is a moral value, and because of its anti-relativistc implications 
for distributive justice. 
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1. Looking back at some important events of the contemporary political and 
ethical reflection, I think that we can say that the foundational efforts have 
been widely disseminated. My opinion is that, for example, the reflection of 
Rawls as that of Dworkin or Gauthier shows a strong propensity for the 
foundation of the liberal community as a right community in a wide moral 
sense.1 However, it seems natural to assume that issues of justice require an 
effort of empirical adjustment inside an empirical framework, otherwise the 
reasons for pursuing them could remain at least unclear. These empirical 
efforts can turn away, however, from those foundations that should justify 
them. It is a risk we always run in every intellectual analysis. Many people 
are often unsatisfied by general analysis that seem unlikely candidates for 
building useful tools to use in everyday judgments, that is as a practical 
guide when we have to decide about the justice or injustice of particular 
situations. This problem has not only to do with the difficulty of handling 
effectively accurate factual information, but also focuses on the degree of 
                                           
1 RAWLS, J., A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971; DWORKIN R., 
Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University press, 1977; GAUTHIER D., Morals by 
Agreement, Oxford University Press, 1986. 
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abstraction that it is desirable to achieve in a theoretical elaboration.2 
Moreover, it seems that it is not sufficient to gain concreteness, simply going 
into the detail. In fact, the deeper you dig in particular, the more you require 
a more precise definition of the regulatory criteria to be used. This 
clarification is much higher than that required when it has to deal with more 
abstract categories, such as those of merit, need, choice, deliberative 
capacity, and so on. When we have to judge on specific issues we need not 
only to be addressed to general rules and to specific rules, which tell us which 
features should be considered as relevant and important, but we need also 
rules that show us which weight should be assigned to each of these features 
when  benefits and constraints are distributed and imposed. It is neither 
wrong nor a sign of epistemological pessimism say that, even with a large 
number of parameters of relevance, much would still remain to be done to fill 
out the individual determinations of justice in the perimeter  of application 
of rights, distributive justice, interests, legitimate expectations. One could 
condense all of this by simply saying that every system of rules, which refers 
to our social, ethical, and political consensus, requires to be submitted to an 
interpretation that show its plausibility –  according to accepted norms –  
and generality in the course of its implementation. 
The ambition to reconcile theoretical foundation and empirical evidence 
is, therefore, fully consistent in ethics and in political philosophy too. The 
idea of Rawls’s  reflective equilibrium is precisely this, that is the search for 
a method for balancing generality and exercising individual judgment. 
Although we can cast many doubt on the method of reflective equilibrium in 
gaining relevant results, the risk of renouncing to any frame of reference for 
empirical judgment is even stronger. In fact, on the opposite side, there 
could be the temptation to dispose of any criterion of judgment that does 
not reflect anything but prudential considerations. This is Rorty’s 
philosophical pragmatism applied to political philosophy, that makes the 
defence of political liberalism a kind of aesthetic and/or a sort of ethical 
rhetoric.3  
The way you actually try to examine whether a particular act falls 
within the categories of shared and possibly rational conception of justice 
                                           
2 It is a well known problem in decision theory, where a big quantity of information 
can prove to be a hindrance to action and problem solving. ELSTER J., Nuts and 
Bolts for the Social Science, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
3 RORTY R., Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, 1982. 
PIERPAOLO MARRONE 
853 
 
could be described as a middle way between rationalism –  à la Rawls–Kant 
–  and prudentialism –  à la Gauthier–Hobbes –  in order to build coherence 
between considered judgments, priority rules and individual judgments. 
When we are engaged in the political–ethical judgment, what is required is 
not the application of mechanical rules, but rather the exercise of a kind of 
practical wisdom. This capability is akin to the judgment of taste, in the 
sense that its core is more in understanding how to judge rightly that in 
pointing out, immediately and unambiguously, how to reach justice in 
particular situations. In our society, qualities of impartiality, operated by 
institutions, and abilities of correcting and mending injustice are elements 
that sketch the figure of the judge rather than that of the politician. 
Regarding politicians, we admit, without any  scandal, that they are the 
representatives of partial interests. Both of these figures speak in the name 
of general interests, but this practice, normal to the judge, is almost never 
real in the case of politicians, if not when the normativity has the features of 
the so-called ‘case of exception’.4 
While it is always difficult to approach facts relating to justice with a 
good balance between theoretical and empirical attitude, I am persuaded 
that any appeal to impartiality must retain something of this approach to 
the problems of right and wrong in its structure of persuasion. Otherwise, 
many would think that we are not talking about justice anymore. When we 
try to determine standards and criteria for the application of justice and 
correction of injustice, what is implicitly recommended is to model ethical–
political judgments on the behavior of a fair judge. This is not just  a revival 
of the theory of the impartial spectator. This happens for two reason. The 
first reason is related to a kind of loss from the point of view of the original 
theory of impartial spectator, since there is not a great emphasis on 
sympathy as a criterion for identification of right ethical–political practices; 
the second reason is that the identification of a specific procedure for 
resolving disputes can be transformed into a clear commitment to 
substantive results.  
Bruce Ackerman’s5 dialogism of is precisely the belief that there is a 
correspondence between appropriate procedures and outcomes, and that the 
                                           
4. SCHMITT C, Le categorie del ‘politico’, Il Mulino, 2013.. 
5 ACKERMAN B., Social Justice in the Liberal State, Yale University press, 1980, 
hereafter SJLS; What is Neutral About Neutrality, “Ethics”, 93, 1983, pp. 372–390; 
On Getting What We Don’t Deserve, “Social Philosophy and Policy”, 1983, pp. 60–
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rules and results of a certain distribution of goods can be regarded as the 
outcome of a conversation conducted in a appropriate manner. This 
assumption is intended by Ackerman as absolutely realistic and certainly not 
naively irenic. Ackerman’s dialogue is intended as a regulated dispute 
between competing visions of the world with accurate and almost immediate 
impact for the distributive justice. For Ackerman, our liberal situation may 
be described as the conscious realization that the struggle for power and 
scarce resources is always possible. Even when the defense offered by social 
institutions allows us to turn to occupations that are not immediately 
connected with the conquest of portions of power, we are never safe from 
any disputes over things that are inside the circle of our property and/or 
availability.6 Obviously, these disputes over things are important as they are 
deemed relevant to our individual description and many of these goods can 
be related to something less easily visible, such as social prestige. By 
Ackerman anyone, at any time, can make a claim on resources which we use 
at the present time simply contesting our right to use them. As a matter of 
fact, we are always living inside a potential general competition between 
agents.7 This is what always runs through our society in an underground 
way. It does not mean that blatant and destructive strives are actually going 
through our liberal societies. Ackerman’s interest is not diagnostic, but 
foundational. From this first assumption – the permanence and presence of 
                                                                                                                            
70; Reconstructing American Law, Harvard University Press, 1984; Neutralities, in 
R. Douglass, G. Mara, H. Richardson (eds.), Liberalism and the Good, cit., pp.19–43; 
Why Dialogue?, “The Journal of Philosophy”, 1989, pp. 5– 22; We the People, 
Harvard University Press, 1993; The Future of Liberal Revolution, Yale University 
Press, 1994. 
6 SJLS, p. 41 “So long as we live, there can be no escape from the struggle for 
power. Each of us must control his body and the world around it. However modest 
these personal claims, they are forever at risk in a world of scarce resources. 
Someone, somewhere, will—if given the chance—take the food that sustains or the 
heart that beats within. Nor need such acts be attempted for frivolous reasons—
perhaps my heart is the only thing that will save a great woman’s life, my food 
sufficient to feed five starving men. No one can afford to remain passive while 
competitors stake their claims. Nothing will be left to reward such self–restraint. 
Only death can purchase immunity from hostile claims to the power I seek to 
exercise”. For a similar argument, see THOMSON J., Rights, Restitution, and Risk, 
Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 1–19. 
7 Such controversy may legitimately occur if the information is shared equally by 
the parties that are disputing. ACKERMAN, B., We the People, p. 148. 
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conflict and competition – we can deduce a first conclusion, that is that the 
focus of philosophy should be not on  our rights, but on the challenges on 
these, which Ackerman thinks as a challenge on legitimacy. For Ackerman, 
rights are not the source that should be taken as a starting point in defense 
of our resources. The origin of political society, of freedom, of all our 
politically relevant behavior is conflict and, even once institutions are 
settled, the permanent reality of it on the background of our peace.  
There are several moves that we can make when we are facing a dispute. 
The strategy at first sight less expensive is to suppress the protester. This is 
not a kind of social paradox or something just said to èpater les philosophes 
nor it is a possible choice without any justification. Indeed, “This is no 
ordinary game; it may reveal that my deepest hopes for myself cannot be 
realized without denying the rights of others. If I succeed in suppressing the 
questioner, I may hope to live as if my power had never been challenged at 
all. It is a tempting prospect, which becomes more seductive as my effective 
power increases. Power corrupts: the more power I have, the more I can lose 
by trying to answer the question of legitimacy; the more power I have, the 
greater the chance that my effort at suppression will succeed–at least for the 
time that remains before I die. “8 
Our societies are mixed systems that attempt to fulfill the questions of 
legitimacy – without, in various ways, suppressing the protesters. 
Intuitively, one of the reasons to avoid a general strategy of repression is 
that in the long term this would represent additional costs to the system 
such as to be practically untenable, unless we succeed in combining complex 
social systems, authoritarian political systems and economic efficiency. 
However, the important thing is that the repression of the question of 
legitimacy is mostly perceived as abnormal in all cases.9 The liberal–
                                           
8 SJLS, p. 42, and p. 354, note: “Is it enough to be prepared to answer the question 
of legitimacy? Must we drop everything and actually engage in a conversation 
whenever anybody challenges any of our claims to power? It would be silly to 
spend our entire lives in a discussion of the single question of legitimacy—at the 
expense of all talk and action on behalf of our personal ideals. Nonetheless, I 
cannot be permitted to evade questioning to such an extent that others are 
uncertain whether they have the power to call me to account at mutually 
convenient times and places.” 
9 In ACKERMAN, B., The Future of Liberal Revolution, he distinguishes three types of 
revolution: religious, romantic, liberal. Only in the latter the demand for legitimacy 
is reversible, that is dialogical. 
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democratic societies are for Ackerman the attempt to satisfy as much as 
possible the questions of legitimacy. For this reason we have to figure out 
what would happen in a society in which questions of legitimacy, namely the 
requirement to justify inequalities, were always met. This society would be 
the accomplishment of the set of action that Ackerman think to be the 
essence of liberalism, namely the conversational interaction guided by the 
principle of neutrality. 
 
 
2. Ackerman believes that it is not necessary to provide ab initio any 
analytical definition of justice, but it is sufficient to keep to its distributive 
function. Even in a situation in which resources were distributed in a 
perfectly equal way we could not exclude the possibility of conflict.10 
Actually, the possibility of conflicts could be excluded only with the 
fulfillment of these two conditions: a limited scarcity and actors that are 
identical from the psychological point of view. Clearly, this is a challenge for 
the imagination, since we should be able to imagine a world without 
marginal utility. 
Some authors think that this definition of justice via distributive justice 
is simply misleading, since justice in the liberal–democratic States affects not 
only the problems of distribution, but i.e. also corrections of aggressive 
pressures, intimidations, harassments, physical violence that individuals or 
groups cause to others.11 What I think it can be said against this position is 
that since distributive justice has the ambition to correct something that got 
wrong, the very problem of injustice is structurally related to it. It remains 
true that this issue, in Ackerman, is not central, but somehow derivative, 
because it can be recognized as such only when we have established an 
agreement on some conversational principles.  
Here we meet an important feature that differentiates Ackerman both 
from Rawls both from other versions of contractualism, for example 
Gauthier’s.12 In Ackerman there is not a problem of original position or of 
the starting point of social negotiation. It does not matter at what point of 
                                           
10 FLATHMAN R., Egalitarian Blood and Skeptical Turnips, “Ethics”, 93, 1983, pp. 
357– 366. 
11 LUCAS, J., On Justice, Clarendon Press, 1980; Lucas, J., The Principles of Politics, 
Oxford University Press, 1966.  
12 GAUTHIER D., Morals by Agreement, Oxford University Press, 1986. 
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the distribution curve someone makes a question of legitimacy. Ackerman 
seems to suggest the issue of the starting point in his metaphor of space 
travel and the discovery of a new world, but it is a didactic makeshift for 
making things clearer. It is, however, obvious that the model of rational 
conversation can be applied right away to our societies, our transactions, 
and our conversations.13 All that is required is a set of cooperative strategies 
in conversation which can be analyzed and reproduced.  
The first strategy is the adoption of the criterion of rationality. This 
strategy states that to the question of legitimacy we must not answered to 
by suppressing the protester, but by providing reasons to justify our use of 
particular resources. It should be noticed that we are faced with a use of the 
term rationality that is very different from that adopted by the majority of 
philosophers and scholars in the human sciences. Usually the meaning of 
rationality comes from the definition used in the economic sciences, where is 
intended as “A decision–making process that is based on making choices that 
result in the most optimal level of benefit or utility for the individual. Most 
conventional economic theories are created and used under the assumption 
that all individuals taking part in an action/activity are behaving 
rationally.”14 Rational behavior considers the adoption of different 
maximization strategies according to purposes to be achieved – purposes 
that could be called hypothetical imperatives. Ackerman’s definition is 
instead very unusual. In its meaning there is a clear teleological direction 
and this is certainly not towards a strategy of maximizing expected utility. 
Rather, it is the adoption of a voluntary behavior that goes deep inside an 
area of uncertainty and risk.15 In fact, being prepared to meet the question 
for legitimacy is not a guarantee that the dialogue will actually take place 
nor that it will go on. 
But if the principle of rationality is not immediately comparable to a 
hypothetical prudential imperative, it would be a mistake to describe it as 
the dialogical display of the categorical imperative. In fact, the principle of 
rationality has and maintains an instrumental character. It is not, for 
                                           
13 Problems of the ethical dimension of the conversation are discussed by 
HABERMAS, J., Moralbewusstsein und kommunicatives Handeln, Suhrkamp, 1983) 
and by CALOGERO, G., Filosofia del dialogo, Edizioni di Comunità, 19692. 
14 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rational– behavior.asp 
15 ZEPPI, S., Il problema del dialogo nel pensiero italiano contemporaneo, La Nuova 
Italia, 1960. 
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Ackerman, directed to gain, through its repeated application, a conception of 
the good which is universally valid; more modestly, it is thought as one of 
the means for enabling the settlement of social disputes in liberal societies. 
That means that principle of rationality has nothing to do with a definition 
of rational behavior, but it is better described as a prescription. In the case 
of rationality, as well as of the other rules, which we will examine shortly, 
the key point is that rationality, being conceived as prescriptive, has 
substantive contents, excluding certain behaviors. There are some reasons 
why rationality is intended this way by Ackerman. One of these is that the 
never– ending adjustment in the struggle for power, often referred to by 
Ackerman, has a ghost that hovers behind this struggle: the behavior of the 
free riders, using the conventional contingency of the rules and their 
instrumentality to selfish ends. The liberal citizen is the one that, on the 
contrary, wants the dialogic rationality together with the other rules. For a 
ackermanian liberal agent, indeed, the egoistic assumptions of a free rider 
cannot be consistent, in the sense that his/her problem is not to ensure the 
legitimacy of the property of the goods. Rationality is never chosen solely on 
consequentialist basis and, at the same time, it does not rely only to an 
internal ethical structure of the agent.  
 It must be stressed another important consideration of Ackerman’s 
philosophy, namely that the principles of dialogue set aside one of the great 
myths of political philosophy: the state of nature. The dialogism just think 
we do not need it. According to Ackerman, “This comprehensive insistence 
on dialogue forces a break with one of the great myths of philosophy–the 
idea of a ‘state of nature.’ While the myth takes many forms, it always tells 
a story in which actors acquire ‘rights’ that are prior to, and independent of, 
their social interaction. How this trick takes place is a matter of some 
dispute–some say by a silent act of unchallenged appropriation, others 
merely stipulate the ‘rights’ their actors possess when they ‘first’ encounter 
one another in a social situation. The important point, though, is the myth’s 
assertion that people have ‘rights’ even before they confront the harsh fact 
of the struggle for power.”16 There are no rights before the experience of 
                                           
16 SJLS, cit., p. 43 and pp. 291–292 “Rather than attempting to arrange all social 
institutions in a way that will maximize his preferred set of values, the contract 
theorist typically concentrates on one or another narrow range of concrete ‘rights’ 
as if they were the decisive litmus for the legitimacy of the entire power ensemble. 
Of course, different theorists promote different concrete interests to the rank of 
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scarcity of goods. A word as ‘rights’ simply alludes to the possibility that 
disputes are settled without resorting to force, on the basis of a common 
reference to cultural models, and this is what happens in the practice of the 
liberal dialogue. But rights are not the foundation of liberal practices, since 
it is always possible that rights themselves are subject to the question of 
legitimacy. The question is whether this kind of move opens the possibility 
for an infinite regress. As a matter of fact, one could always question who 
questions his/her legitimacy. Ackerman believes that there is one way to cut 
off this possibility, that is the plain fact that agents taking part in the 
dialogue are equal in one respect, namely that they are equally worth. But 
this appears to be, rather, even in Ackerman, the disguised statement of a 
right which may still be subject to a new question of legitimacy. However, 
what is important for Ackerman is that there is any need to constrain 
liberalism neither to a natural law model, nor to a contractual model. 
Ackerman, in fact, identifies two flaws in contractualism. First, it describes 
dialogue as at most instrumental to the recognition of rights. “Since the 
principle of Rationality conceives this dialogue as the foundation of all 
claims of right, it requires a subtler, but no less decisive, break with a second 
familiar myth–the idea of ‘social contract.’ Although the parties to a social 
contract must speak to one another while negotiating its terms, this 
conversation is understood in instrumental terms only. It does not constitute 
the ground of the rights that emerge from the bargaining process but simply 
serves as a means to induce the parties to give their consent to the contract 
terms. Indeed, the most compelling versions of the contract myth try to cut 
                                                                                                                            
fundamental rights. Nonetheless, once they have succeeded in “solving” the 
characterization problem in one way or another, all contractarians agree that the 
rights they have generated are of decisive significance. The result, from the 
utilitarians’ perspective, is a peculiar tunnel vision. On the one hand, even a trivial 
violation of one of the favored rights is cause for furrowed brow and anxious cry; on 
the other hand, a program involving the welfare of millions will fail to engage the 
contractarian’s attention, let alone concern, so long as it does not trench upon his 
precious rights. This narrow vision seems to belie the contractarian’s proud claim 
that he aims to vindicate the rights of all mankind; tunnel vision seems more 
characteristic of the vulgar ideologist intent upon the vindication of his class 
interest above all else. This is not to say that the utilitarian cannot find a useful 
place for rights talk; as we have seen, he may well endorse a bill of rights that 
contains “absolute” protections for interests that would otherwise be slighted in 
majoritarian politics. He objects only when rights talk is made an end in itself, 
unrelated to a more comprehensive method of social analysis.” 
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through the chatter of precontractual negotiation by designing a bargaining 
situation in which no rational actor has any sensible choice but to sign on 
the dotted line. Protracted discussion about contract terms at the founding 
convention is often positively harmful–it can reveal strategic possibilities for 
bluffing and coalition formation that may make the terms of the contract 
indeterminate. And it is only each party’s promise to abide by the contract 
that constitutes the basis of his social rights and duties–not the talk that 
precedes or follows the magic moment of promising.”17 Second, 
contractualism grants an irrational privilege to the mythical moment of 
promise. This second element contrasts with an elementary principle of 
economy. We, in fact, do not need to go beyond the current practices of 
social dialogue, in which there are all needed justifications for our concrete 
requests. 
 
 
3. Dialogue is not a mere eristic dispute which purpose is to overthrow the 
positions of the opponent to achieve verbal victory. The aim of dialogue is 
truth. Focusing on this purpose, one could say that  Ackerman’s dialogue is 
akin to judicial cross examination.18 For this reason it is therefore necessary 
                                           
17 SJLS, p. 14 and p. 281: “Yet this is no simple task, for the fact is that I am not 
some apolitical being but a resident of an organized society from the moment of my 
birth. Nor am I merely physically dependent upon others for my continued 
survival; I am culturally dependent upon them for the very materials I have used 
in constructing a notion of myself and my ends in life. I simply could never have 
started my effort at self– definition without an encounter with the models of 
behavior and the languages made available by my contemporaries and 
predecessors. This is not to say that there is no sense in thinking of myself as a 
distinct person with a distinctive personality and objectives; it is rather to say that 
whatever individuality I possess has not been gained independently of society but 
rather as a result of an interaction with society. Now, if this is so, then the 
contractarian is really making an extraordinary demand when he asks us to think 
of ourselves as potential entrants. For this cannot be accomplished by undressing 
ourselves in the mind’s eye and observing what we are wearing underneath. 
Whatever we find is no less a product of our encounter with organized society than 
that which we discard. Of course, the suppressed material may be very different 
from the surface, but I know of no interpretation of its meaning that would entirely 
ignore its relationship to the social processes through which we define our 
individuality.” 
18 ACKERMAN, B., Reconstructing American Law, cit., pp. 93–98. 
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that the dialogue has a certain structure, namely that it is a discourse bound 
to certain conditions. For Ackerman the only alternatives to the 
individuation of a dialogic structure are either the production of a 
background noise or an incomprehensible and ominous silence. Clearly, 
many of the limitations that are found in our conversations are 
conventional, but most of these requirements are not demanding. Except in 
very special circumstances, if I make an order at the restaurant I do not 
expect to start an exchange of philosophical opinions. If this happens, the 
dialogue is perceived as abnormal. Ackerman goes further and believes that 
it is possible to constrain the discourse on power to rules that are not social 
conventions, since thinking on rules as befitting conventional rules cannot 
avoid circularity.19 “Even the most egregious boor recognizes that a 
conversation with the telephone operator is not a suitable vehicle for a blow– 
by– blow account of his life. It is this familiar sense of conversational 
constraint6 that I mean to put to a new use. Just as there are constraints 
imposed in other conversations, I also want to constrain the dialogues in 
which people talk to one another about their claims to power. Not that I 
wish to constrain power talk by appealing to social etiquette. Notions of 
conventional propriety presuppose the legitimacy of the power structure, 
rather than vice versa. The question, instead, is whether fundamental 
philosophical arguments can be advanced to justify one or another 
constraint on power talk”20. So Ackerman proposes two further conditions, 
in addition to rationality, which should not be compromised with the 
conventionality .  
 The first additional requirement required to rationality is consistency. 
Consistency requires that the subject adopts reasons to justify his/her power 
which are not inconsistent with his/her other reasons that he/she will provide 
to make any request of power. About this condition (“The reason advanced 
by a power wielder on one occasion must not be inconsistent with the reasons 
he advances to justify his other claims to power.”21), it should be noted that 
it does not specify the time lapse during which this condition should be 
effective. It does not seem, in other words, be irrational that the subject A at 
time t1 justify his/her use of a certain good with a certain group of reasons 
                                           
19 LEWIS, D., Convention: A Philosophical Study, Harvard University Press, 1969. 
20 SJLS, p. 16; see Neutralities, cit., p. 29, where it is clearly said that neutrality is a 
value that must be understood in relation to other values. 
21 SJLS, p. 15. 
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p1, and that at the time t2, to justify the claim on another good, his/her can 
propose a a series of reasons p2, that are not consistent, in whole or in part, 
with p1. A could be justify his/her new position, not hypocritically, by 
saying that in the meantime he/she has changed his/her mind. For 
Ackerman, at this point he/she will have to abandon one of the two groups of 
sentences, if he/she wants that  his/her behaviors over time can be seen as 
having some consistency. But it is not necessary that this happens, and it is 
not clear why it should be happens. To apply requirement of consistency to 
agents, one must also require a commitment to a strong solution of personal 
identity. The person who is called to satisfy a requirement of strong 
consistency, i.e. consistency over time, should not consider himself/herself an 
ens successivum. This could mean that conversational coherence implies some 
metaphysical conditions relating to personal identity, that is to the idea of a 
subject that remains relatively stable, for making the performance of a 
dialogue sufficiently stable.22 Ackerman’s rules of conversational constraints 
are thought not only as justifications required for individuals, but also as 
constraints on the justifications required for political groups. If we strictly 
apply the requirement of consistency, we can figure out that probably a few 
political parties could satisfy it, with the exception of parties with a clear 
prescriptive teleological ideology.23 Usually, however, parties of this kind are 
prone to fanaticism and therefore it is difficult to think that they can 
participate in the liberal dialogue as it is thought by Ackerman. The 
principle of consistency, therefore, has a definite metaphysical 
characterization – in my opinion more metaphysical than that of the 
principle of rationality – expressed by its commitment to identity over time. 
A moral–ethical characterization of liberal dialogue is clear also in the 
other conversational principle that is required to register citizens  as 
participants to liberal society, namely neutrality. This principle asserts the 
invalidity of any justification in which one makes use of ad hominem 
arguments (“Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power 
holder to assert: (a) that his conception of the good is better than that 
                                           
22 CHISOLM, R., Person and Object, Open Court, 1979 pp. 89– 113. 
23 We must not ignore the fact that the distinction between tactics and strategy is 
controversial. Sometime it is simply required to pass the test of consistency through 
time, while, at the same time, preserving the substantial freedom of violating it 
when it can be more convenient. SCHELLING, T., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard 
University Press, 1990. 
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asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception 
of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow 
citizens.”24). This means that it is not allowed saying that his/her conception 
of the good is better than others to justify his/her claim to power or that, 
apart from his/her own conception of the good, he/she is inherently superior 
to other citizens. Neutrality is much more than a frigid description of liberal 
mind. For Ackerman, in fact, the skeptical strategy, probably the first that 
comes to mind in defending this conversational principle, is not the only or 
even possibly the main one. The skeptic argues that since views on how to 
pursue good life are divergent, it follows that no substantive conception of 
the good is better and worthier than any other and, therefore, it is better to 
choose some procedural neutrality, on which at least we can all agree about. 
However, for Ackerman the road to be taken is another. There are some 
substantial arguments that work just as well as skeptical argument in 
justifying neutral conversational principle. The first refers to the concept of 
Mill’s experiments in living and to its antiauthoritarian contents;25 the 
                                           
24 SJLS, p. 18. 
25 MILL, J.S., On Liberty and Other Writings, Cambridge University press, 2014 and 
BERLIN, I., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, where the concept is 
examined on several occasions. On Mill, see SJLS, pp. 158–159: “This freedom 
from censorship is but an aspect of an even broader right to free competition. Not 
only may I learn of competing offers but I may accept one of them without your 
imposing some special sanction upon me. While you have the right to refuse to deal 
with me, you may not go beyond this and take affirmative action to block my 
favored relationship. Thanks to our wonderful rawn with preternatural clarity. 
Quite simply, you are guilty of the charge of monopolization if you make any effort 
to sabotage my shield so that you can impose a special sanction on me for dealing 
with one of your competitors. This clean definition of monopolization, finally, 
permits us to fulfil Mill’s promise by locating an important category of self– 
regarding actions that are, in principle, immune from State suppression. The 
traditional solution has been cast in terms of an action’s harmfulness: if it causes 
harm to others, then the government may properly control it; if not, not. 
Unfortunately, this test threatens Mill’s principle with trivality: it is hardly 
possible that the government will regulate conduct unless somebody complains 
about it; and people will never complain unless they conceive themselves harmed in 
one way or another. Consequently, a great deal of energy has been devoted to 
defining the sorts of harms that fail to qualify as really harmful. The favorite effort 
has been to deny that “merely” psychological harms are harmful. Yet this venture 
generates familiar difficulties. Not only is it hard to distinguish the “merely” 
harmful from the “really” harmful, but one wants to know why psychological 
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second refers to a peculiar interpretation of the concept of autonomy and 
self–deliberation, according to which means that are chosen to pursue life 
plans are not indifferent to the value of these plans; the third is as follows: 
even if you think you know what good is and that imposing it to the others 
will result in a general welfare, you cannot be sure that people, who are 
responsible for the imposition of the good, have a special moral endowment 
as to be incorruptible. As this last argument crosses the paths of neutrality is 
not clear, however, because it entails many and unexplained anthropological 
assumption, and, in any case, it is a path that Ackerman leaves largely 
undetermined. As happens for the other two principles, neutrality may seem 
defended both by substantive arguments and even by skeptical arguments, 
but it derives its strength from a structural idea of what a theory of justice 
should be.  
 
 
4. Ackerman’s theory, in fact, holds together three elements which are 
strictly tied up.26 The first is the reference to interpersonal comparisons and 
intrapersonal comparisons between different possible states along the time 
span in the mechanisms of distribution. Equality refers to a mechanism like 
that, and the same consideration also applies to other principles like 
utilitarianism, maximin strategies, and so on. To apply a structural principle 
you need to know two things: a) how a set of possible outcomes should be 
preferred; b) what should be considered as a real gain for individuals. 
Ackerman, like Rawls, provides a structural theory in this sense. The 
difference is that Rawls explains that the gain is obtained in terms of 
primary social goods. For Ackerman, the equivalent of primary social goods 
is what is gained from social bargaining through liberal dialogue, that is 
possible to translate into monetary income, health, education, adherence to 
a certain structure of freedom and political obligations. To understand how 
these assets should be distributed, Rawls uses the notion of maximin and the 
                                                                                                                            
affront is necessarily less serious than other kinds of hurt. The answer is generally 
nothing better than an impassioned plea about the need to draw a clear line 
“somewhere” if individual liberty is to be assured.”, where Ackerman try to give an 
interpretation of the non– utilitarian non– interference principle of the State in 
individual choices based on the principle of the greater amount of information 
available to citizens. 
26 See FISHKIN, J., Can There Be a Neutral Theory of Justice?, “Ethics”, 93, 1982, 
pp. 349-356. 
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idea of lexical order of the principles of justice. What in Rawls’s theory is 
called ‘veil of ignorance’, in Ackerman is a generic appeal to undominated 
equality, that includes an approximately equal basis of material goods and 
an indifference to the genetic composition of individuals – provided that, in 
one way or another, they can participate to the dialogical exchange.27  
The second central feature shared by both Rawls and Ackermanand is 
an anti–intuitionistic attitude shared by both. This attitude is played 
towards the traditional problem of distributive justice in Rawls; in 
Ackerman is the structure itself of dialogue that is intended to set aside 
intuition. In Rawls, since the starting point is reached through a process of 
deprivation of information, the distributive outcomes are continually subject 
to a kind of transcendental verification; in Ackerman, there is no claim of 
transcendental verification and uniformity in outcomes is merely contingent. 
What is important is neutrality and, simply, dialogism seems to be one of 
the main instruments to affirm the priority of neutrality. If someone will be 
able to find out more efficient strategies, then we will have reached a further 
stage of liberal theory. It seems clear that dialogic principles have been 
introduced in a reverse order of importance and generality. Then, it seems 
clear the main objective of Ackerman: once neutrality has been introduced 
will be possible only certain outcomes compatible with the practice of 
dialogue and not others.28  
Neutrality, thus, as conceived by Ackerman is devoid of substantive 
contents? The interpretation of the principle of neutrality that is more easily 
defensible is what I will call strict. This interpretation is not compatible with 
any claim of approximately uniqueness of the outcomes flowing from the 
principles of justice. As far as is compatible with the ideal of undominated 
equality, however, it does not allow to give a roughly uniform content even 
to this principle. It is true that the idea of neutrality is conceptually 
compatible, no doubt to a high degree, with the idea of equality, but as long 
as it does not give any content to the latter. There is, moreover, a version of 
neutrality which Ackerman does a fairly extensive use of. This version 
                                           
27 SJLS, cit., pp. 122–126.  
28 Thus, for example, the racist speech of the Nazi is not so much logically refuted, 
since reduced to absurdity by showing that the Nazis must in some part to accept 
one of conversational constraints, and, accepting one, or a part thereof, must also 
accept all others, otherwise his/her speech is likely to be foolish or incoherent or 
meaningless. Of course, Ackerman does not claim that this argument has some 
value for the Nazis. See SJLS, pp. 129–132. 
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simply states that if each person is as good as any other, each person should 
have at least as any other has. A less strict interpretation of neutrality would 
be forced to promote a certain distribution of what performs the function of 
primary goods. But which interpretation of neutrality should be privileged? 
Neutrality taken as structural criteria of a certain distribution of private 
property, or neutrality as an equal initial distribution of opportunities, or 
even neutrality as an ideal mean of correction in the distribution of goods? 
We can choose to weaken neutrality, as it were, and favor a large 
interpretation. However, when we weak neutrality we make it for some goal, 
and this is equivalent to introduce hide principles, so it will be always 
doubtful that the outcomes derived from a weakened neutrality are derived 
by a single principle.  
Ackerman is induced to adopt a strict interpretation – which, in my 
opinion, is the only logically plausible – of neutrality, when he adopts anti–
perfectionist  and anti–utilitarian positions. Let us assume that two people 
are disputing on portion of wealth and that an equal arithmetical 
distribution is not considered fair. Let us assume that one person wants to 
use it to devote himself/herself to climbing, while the other would like to 
concentrate on theoretical contemplation. In accordance with the principle 
of neutrality, it is not possible to justify the claim of the first party about an 
inherent superiority of climbing. Appealing to a greater utility of climbing 
meets all the difficulties of interpersonal comparisons.29 But let us assume 
that the first person has a perfect technology of justice, and that he/she is 
not just satisfied to assert greater utility of his/her end, but that he/she 
wants to applies to his/her choice a benthamian hedonistic calculus. He 
programs a computational machine with an appropriate algorithm for 
comparing two rival activities, and at the end of the process climbing is 
actually the activity that produces the greatest utility. But does this prove 
something? The very idea of calculus in social situations assumes some 
values that could be in conflict with at least some of ideals that are 
considered as a priority by other citizens. “To put the point more broadly 
still, the problem with utilitarianism is its teleological character, its effort to 
evaluate distribution rules by how much ‘good’ they produce. Any such 
effort requires a specification of the good that will be contested by some 
citizens who insist on measuring their good by a different yardstick, one that 
gives them more manna than their competitors. Once the issue is framed in 
                                           
29 ARROW, K., Social Choice and Individual Values, Yale University Press, 1953. 
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this way, there seems to be no reasoned resolution of the conflict within the 
limits of discourse established by Neutrality.”30  
 But probably the concept of neutrality that Ackerman would like to 
use is so strict that it turns against, for a kind of heterogenesis of ends, to the 
same meter which is adopted to resolve disputes over distribution. In fact, if 
A is worth at least as much as B, this would seem to imply that A is entitled 
to an amount of manna at least equal to that of any other contenders in the 
distribution process. But what assures us that the yardstick used to 
determine what ‘at least’, ‘worth’ ‘as much as’ mean are equal for all social 
agents? Even in the abstraction sketched by Ackerman, there is no 
guarantee that an equal distribution of goods cannot made notable 
differences in the satisfaction of the competing conceptions of the good of 
agents. If we have to be suspicious of any specification of the content of 
equality, then why not be suspicious even toward that particular 
specification that relies on the quantitative determination of the asset of the 
good to be distributed? Maybe we can choose an alternative path. If we 
agree to enforce the prohibition of screening particular conceptions of the 
good as superior to others, we may rely on the principle of allowing a 
different distribution as long as it allows an equal satisfaction of the goals 
through which actors see their lives as meaningful. In a pattern like this, it 
would not be formally violated any conditions required by Ackerman. But 
how to figure out that agents committed to different conceptions of life 
would agree on a general meaning of ‘different distributions for an equal 
satisfaction’? The possibility to allocate resources on a quantitative basis is 
bound to an prejudice never discussed by Ackerman. Only in case that the 
quantitative criterion is taken from the beginning like the one that is the 
most appropriate for deciding any gains of the people, then it would be 
possible to decide which different distribution amounts of goods could 
produce equal amounts of utility. 
However, it is difficult to understand how it is possible to introduce any 
quantitative algorithm that takes into account the different satisfaction or 
                                           
30 SJLS, cit., p. 96. The problem is even more clearly in the case of 
intergenerational justice. See pp. 197: “The same cannot be said of the utilitarian’s 
approach to trusteeship: the measure of intergenerational justice no longer depends 
on one or another question– begging manipulation of the original position; instead, 
it rests on a calculation that is clear in principle if fuzzy in practice. The only 
trouble is that the utilitarian’s answers are clearly illiberal.” 
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well– being related to the allocation of different amounts of goods. In fact, 
this algorithm would have to describe precise correlations between different 
psychological states associated with agents. To do this, we should say that 
satisfaction is not influenced by any vision of good, which is the true 
criterion of ordering preference of the subject, and this  is highly implausible. 
The concept of marginal utility, for example, calls to mind precisely this 
series of psychological mechanisms. But neutrality, in fact, forbids us to 
compare different conceptions of good.31 So the idea of an algorithm in 
distribution seems to be fatal to neutrality in any case. 32  
 
 
5. An example of these difficulties comes from the problem of natural and 
genetic allocations, that is the gene pool with which the actors appear on the 
theater of social bargaining. The positions Ackerman has in mind can be 
grouped into two major groups: the utilitarian position and that 
contractualistic one. Problems of genetic allocations seem to find an easy 
solution from an utilitarian point of view. Indeed, “After all, no problem is 
too big for the greatest happiness principle. When provided a perfect 
technology of justice, the clear– thinking utilitarian would be utterly 
opposed to the liberal use of a lottery to select a genetic distribution out of 
an almost infinite set of undominated options. Instead, he will take 
advantage of the Geneticist’s information to arrange genes in a way, X, that 
maximizes overall utility. Now, of course, in choosing his favored X, the 
utilitarian will confront familiar problems in defining happiness more 
precisely and explaining how it may be summed to an overall societal 
total.”33 Utilitarianism does not ensure, therefore, that its solutions will be 
illiberal, because there is no assurance that cases of genetic dominance will 
be avoided; instead, these cases are rejected by a natural lottery that in 
Ackerman’s opinion is the most favorable conditions for dialogue. So, “Thus, 
the utilitarian’s willingness to manipulate genes for the sake of happiness 
presupposes the legitimacy of a political effort to define the good. In 
contrast, the liberal’s insistence on a lottery among undominated options 
                                           
31 GROVER, R., The Ranking Assumption, “Theory and Decision”, 1974, pp. 277– 
299. 
32 Further considerations on this issue can be found in JEFFREY, R., On 
Interpersonal Utility Theory, “The Journal of Philosophy”, 1971, pp. 647–656. 
33 SJLS, p. 120. 
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follows from his effort to organize power relations in a way that permits each 
citizen to participate in a Neutral dialogue. My aim here, as elsewhere, is to 
suggest that this difference in basic theoretical structure is of more than 
theoretical interest; it generates strikingly different results in every 
fundamental area of the power struggle.”34 Clearly, an utilitarian who 
happens to be also liberal can successfully mitigate the consequences of the 
dominance of certain illiberal natural endowments. However, a strategy of 
this kind would be always a second choice and would not be dominant in the 
hedonistic calculus. 
The resources of contractualism to address the problem are 
unconvincing, too. The picture that Rawls outlines on the information of the 
parties involved in the original position makes totally unrealistic not only 
the problem of choosing one’s own body, but the problem of the choice of 
almost every preference. “Such a creature is so removed from our common 
experience that the nature of his preferences remains altogether mysterious. 
If, however, the theorist tries to make the preferences of his hypothetical 
contractor more intelligible by endowing him with a physical body, then it 
becomes difficult to speak of the contractor as choosing one genetic 
distribution over another. Instead of choosing a distribution, the contractor 
has instead been given a body by the theorist o as to make his choices on other 
subjects intelligible to us.”35 Genetic endowments are part of a natural lottery 
that cannot aspire to any moral justification for Rawls. Unable to embrace 
eugenics programs, Rawls prefers to offer compensatory advantages in 
educational programs and in tax reductions. But perhaps Rawls gets by too 
cheaply. Remember that the formulation of the principle of difference 
concerns the distribution of social opportunities, and these refer to the 
distribution of primary goods “Now genes obviously have to do with several 
of Rawls’s social values: opportunity, income, wealth, and self–respect. And 
if Rawls’s principle is given a simplistic interpretation, it can authorize 
genetic manipulation that would destroy much or all of the genetic diversity 
legitimated in a liberal State. ‘Opportunity’ is particularly troublesome. 
While it is not impossible to arrange things so that different genotypes 
                                           
34 SJLS, p. 120. 
35 SJLS, p. 121.  
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receive equal income or wealth, there is an obvious sense in which people 
with different genes do not have equal opportunities.”36  
Dialogism would be in a better position to tackle the problem, because it 
is sufficient to assume that there is some activity that is relevant to some 
conception of the good in which someone has an advantage. “So long as 
there is some conception of the good at which you are comparatively 
advantaged, you cannot verbalize your sense of grievance in a way that 
survives the conversational constraint imposed by Neutrality.”37  If you look 
at the genetic distribution with attention, the conclusions we must reached 
are, for Ackerman, simple conclusions of common sense. Some individuals 
are gifted in a certain area, others in another area. If I have the opportunity 
to select whether to be Usain Bolt or Paco De Lucia and I choose for the 
second opportunity, I cannot complain if Usain Bolt runs faster than me and 
he cannot claim as unfair that he is not a virtuoso in playing guitar. My 
inferiority in certain sectors are offset by my greater ability in others. There 
are areas where I have a certain degree of genetic dominance, others in which 
I suffer, but the important thing is that I have no hope to convince my 
interlocutors that I am ever in a disadvantaged position on the basis of 
dialogic principles.  
In the discussion of the genetic allocations Ackerman makes a slight, but 
significant shifting in his conception of neutrality. There is no longer any 
pretense to avoid an internal reference by agents to their own conceptions of 
the good, but it is granted that all distributions of genetic endowment, which 
do not pass the test of neutrality, should be excluded. Others genetic 
distributions are permitted because of the belief that they will not give raise 
to undominated diversity. However, there is a really important issue to 
think about: there is a strong contrast between the initial distribution of 
goods –  manna –  that seem must be equal and the distribution of natural 
endowments, that seems to be casual and, therefore, unequal.  
It may be objected that the first distribution is conventional and/or 
derived from the principles of neutrality, and the other (gene pool) is natural 
and does not depend on our arrangements. This is true, but it is contingent 
upon us which weights should have at least some distribution of genetic 
effects. So, the question seems to be, once again, the interpretation of the 
                                           
36 SJLS, p. 122. The search for individual well–being is approached by Ackerman 
like akin to property rights. ACKERMAN, B., We the People, p. 25. 
37 SJLS, p. 118. 
PIERPAOLO MARRONE 
871 
 
consequences. The weight that we are willing  to attribute to some genetic 
resources are clearly dependent on different conceptions of good. It is, 
therefore, difficult to argue that same conversational strategies are effective 
in both cases, explaining relevant  differences with, in the case of the manna, 
scarcity and a limited amount of solutions, and, in the case of genes, with its 
abundance. It is not clear how the insistence on an equal initial distribution 
of resources should be defended on the neutralist basis and an unequal 
distribution of genetic resources can be defended on the very same basis. In 
this last case, in fact, Ackerman evaluates as eligible only those gains that 
everyone should deem reasonable on the basis of his/her own conception of 
good, but when he faces the problem of distributing material resources he 
makes use of an external criterion that considers worse any distribution that 
is quantitatively lower than that of any other agent. That means that 
Ackerman allows the reference to the personal conception of good in the first 
case, but not in the second. How do you know that an egalitarian 
distribution equally promotes all different conceptions of good which are 
compatible with liberal dialogue?38 At first glance, it would seem that the 
problem of determining whether the procedures of the distribution of 
resources to an agent is simple. He must not receive a lower asset of 
resources than other agents. In the case of the distribution of material 
external resources the answer might, after all, still be easy, but in the case of 
the genetic endowment the test to be applied is clearly another, or because it 
refers to an anthropological concept of ‘normal human being’ or because it 
refers to a peculiar vision of good or because, more probably, it keeps 
together both. For Ackerman it is necessary to reach that point of 
distribution that allows to all citizens an equal contribution to liberal 
dialogue. Ackerman thinks that this point, however, is not bound on any 
particular distribution of goods, even if we do not call it as undefined and 
blurred. It certainly excludes some outcome, but it allows many more. 
The issue of neutrality, as a problem of distributing  opportunities, gets 
us some important suggestions from the discussion that dedicates Ackerman 
to pedagogical issues.39 Even in the case of education of children it must be 
                                           
38 LUCAS, J., Against Equality, “Philosophy”, 1965, pp. 296-307. 
39 See also COHEN, E.-D., Paternalism that does not Restrict Individuality: 
Criteria and Applications, “Social Theory and Practice”, 1986, pp. 309-335; 
LUNA, F., Paternalism and the Argument from Illiteracy, “Bioethics”, 1995, pp. 
283-290. 
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fulfilled the conditions imposed by the conversational constraints. What 
could make the issue complicated is the fact that here we have to do with 
people who are not yet citizens, at least for one important point: they cannot 
always advance the question of legitimacy. One of the tasks of a liberal 
society is to make effective the background conditions that can best 
facilitate the entry of future citizens as full participants in the liberal 
dialogue. This must happens without falling into paternalism, which is a 
violation of neutrality.  
If here we are facing a problem of distribution of resources, we should 
ask what kind of resource is education? In a liberal society education 
distributes equal opportunities, avoiding as much as possible that someone 
imposes on those who are approaching to the educational process his/her 
own vision of the good. This is the reason why liberal society cannot 
consistently encourage private and/or confessional education. Children are 
not, in fact, owned by anyone and there is no right, for those who exercise 
authority over them, to choose the education that is more coherent with 
their own vision of good. “Parents are not permitted to view childish 
resistance as a kind of weed that destroys the beauty of their private garden; 
they must increasingly recognize the right of others to provide the child with 
cultural materials with which she may forge the beginnings of an identity 
that deviates from parental norms. […] until the day comes when she has 
gained sufficient control over her aggressions and sufficient experience with 
the larger world to claim the right to define and pursue her own conception 
of the good, like every other full citizen of a liberal State.”40  
However, can we say that this happens without any reference to some 
vision of the good? When liberal societies distribute opportunities of this 
kind, these opportunities are neutral chances offered to future citizens to 
realize any vision of the good? It would seem that things are going well when 
not paternalistic education is stressed,41 but the insistence on the conditions 
of possibility of the construction of equal opportunities implies a clear option 
for certain values, for example, those values that make us fully citizens, 
being able to develop our own conception of the good. It is not necessarily 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
40 SJLS, p. 137. 
41 An original perspective on paternalism is offered by F. Hubbard, Justice, Limits 
to Growth and an Equilibrium State, “Philosophy and Public Affairs”, 1978, pp. 
326–345. 
PIERPAOLO MARRONE 
873 
 
that every agent must design his/her own vision of the good potentially in 
conflict with that of any other. The ability required for self–deliberation can 
just as be effectively deployed in joining to a received conception of the 
good. As a matter of fact, this is what frequently happens, certainly also for 
reasons of social equilibrium. When in pedagogical issues liberal society gives 
priority to all those values that improve autonomy, is this process really 
indipendent from stating that autonomy is a better value? If we say that 
achieving autonomy is great gain for people, this gain is really a gain just for 
who that already believe that autonomy and self–deliberation are values to 
pursue for other citizens. 
What reasons are there for a religious person or simply for anyone who 
does not adhere to an ethic of autonomy to implement decision–making 
autonomy and self–deliberation in a liberal society and to encourage them in 
their children? Only a complete lack of understanding of the implications of 
these concepts for their own conceptions of good. Of course, I do not want to 
say that autonomy is not, from a liberal point of view, a good highly 
desirable thing and the more morally significant feature in a liberal ethics. 
My idea is that binding it to neutrality does not mean that it instantly 
becomes more attractive, precisely because procedural neutrality cannot 
constrain moral principles remaining impartial.  
 
 
6. Arguments in favor of certain principles presuppose, thus, a preponderant 
place assigned by Ackerman to neutrality in any ranking of values. In order 
to refute utilitarianism Ackerman is forced to adopt a rigid conception of 
neutrality in distributive justice. However, the rigid conception of neutrality 
adopted against utilitarianism presupposes what has always been the 
greatest obstacle to this conception of morality, namely the possibility of 
making interpersonal comparisons.42 Utility is a such a complex index, 
variable from individual to individual, that many have felt that we are here 
faced with a de facto impossibility. The same problem, however, also applies 
to Ackerman’s conception of neutrality. The fact that it is true that I am 
worth at least as much as you are and that it is true that I am entitled to at 
least the same amount of resources as you are entails that what I have is 
worth at least as much as what you have. This implies that it is possible to 
                                           
42 CARLSON, G., Plans, Expectations, and Act–Utilitarian Distrust, “Philosophical 
Studies”, 1979, pp. 295– 300. 
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perform a comparison of different values on a neutral basis. Unless, however, 
that we do embrace a shared ethical commitment on neutrality this is not 
possible. Embracing, therefore, a structural theory of justice is hardly 
compatible with a strict conception of neutrality, since the distributive 
outcomes that are allowed by this are completely undefined. Ackerman 
therefore surreptitiously introduces a less rigid and more elastic conception 
of neutrality.  
What in Ackerman performs the function of Rawls’s primary goods are 
those conditions that allow the full participation to the dialogic 
environment. Doing this, however, means to introduce a kind of 
measurement, which allows us to treat citizens viewing their perspective 
placement of their intention, as they are shown in the practice of dialogue, 
inside liberal society. Only if there is this teleological attitude, it does make 
sense to treat people equally.This priority is lexically antecedent to 
distribution. For example, State could provide all citizens with an equal 
salary. From one point of view who would deny that it is a choice of 
equality? But very few, I suppose, would feel satisfied. The reason is that the 
equality, in a neutralist perspective, it is more a matter of procedure than a 
matter of substantive considerations. Since we are not equal with respect to 
our ability, and we know that different capacities receive different 
appreciation in different circumstances, then in liberal societies we call for 
another kind of equality, that is the procedural one. 
Ackerman implicitly believes that we should put a content into 
neutrality, through an initial provision of units of goods, in order to correct 
some inequalities in our society,43 but when he specify what these assets are, 
he also opens the path to a very strong objection: why taking into account 
certain specific goods rather than others? Why emphasizing on certain 
distribution rather than on another? Ackerman’s dialogism pretends to mark 
a distance from Rawls’s contractualism, because it is deemed incapable of 
foundational power, but it really meet a similar difficulty. In the original 
position the choice of principles is operated without reference to particular 
conceptions of the good, which are considered only when that choice has 
already been made. Rawls believes, however, that it is necessary to allow a 
weak conception (thin theory) of the asset that can provide a guide to the 
parties under the veil of ignorance. This is the ability to see one’s own life as 
                                           
43 For comparison with the ideology of the New Deal, cfr. Reconstructing American 
Law, pp. 72. 
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meaningful, pursuing and consciously choosing the most appropriate means 
to fulfill this meaning, that is a moral end. This weakening of the theory of 
the good, however, leaves undetermined what this meaning is, that is an 
index of primary goods that should change, according to the chancing of 
that meaning. To overcome this difficulty, Rawls has been forced to 
introduce a conception of the moral person as widespread in a well–ordered 
society, thus assuming and not  founding the teleological ordering of 
society.44 Similarly, the performance of Ackerman’s dialogue tells us nothing 
about methods of distribution.45 If neutrality is understood in the strict 
sense, then there is no compatibility with any structural principles of 
distributive justice; if it is understood in the weak sense, on the contrary, 
there will be possible to determine a single distribution structure and a 
unique arrangement of principles of justice only violating some conceptions 
of good.  
 Stressing on neutrality is not only part of the rhetoric of Ackerman, but 
belongs to the whole liberal tradition. What are the assumptions that in this 
tradition can be precisely relate with neutrality? Some of these are not 
necessarily bound to a liberal interpretation. There is, in fact, first of all, the 
plain observation of the human beings as essentially oriented towards the 
achievement of goals. But these purposes and the assets that are derived 
from them are not unique, but plural and potentially conflicting. In order to 
achieve their goals is always needed acquiring some goods. However, these 
goods are usually subject to scarcity. It follows that social conflict cannot be 
completely eliminated, nor –  with typical passage from is to ought –  it 
should be. The problem is rather to contain it and reduce it to an acceptable 
size. The task of liberal politics is to design an order that allows the pursuit 
of different ends for individuals within a structure of regulated and not 
destructive conflict. Political philosophy is the search for those structures 
that best promote these goals.  
Since much of the political activity is aimed at the realization of 
cooperative goals tied to specific conceptions of the good, so that it is easier 
for everyone to realize their goals, in Ackerman’s vision each must also 
renounces to the claims of superiority of his/her own vision of the good on 
the others. For this reason, the purpose of the State is to preserve the 
                                           
44 RAWLS, J.,  Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 2005. 
45 ACKERMAN, B., On Getting What We Don’t Deserve, that specifically deals with 
the problems of acquisition and is the first version of Ackerman’s dialogism. 
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conversational constraints and apply them wherever possible. This is a kind 
of ideal situation, but it is also possible to conceive what would be a society 
where the dialogic constraints were predominant. It would exclude disputes 
on moral ends and what would count would be only underwrite the rules 
that maintain order and avoid conflicts, rules different from any substantial 
purposes of the agents. Keeping alive the dialogue seems to become itself the 
end of moral and political order.  
It is somehow strange that this outcome, designed as neutral, is reached 
through a conception of voluntary cooperation based on anthropological 
features.46 According to this conception, individuals are endowed with a 
structure that governs their preferences. It is assumed that every individual 
is a fusion of limited selfishness and limited altruism and, moreover, it is 
believed that this description is not subject to historical change. The 
preferences of the subject would not be actually exogenous or at least we 
must treat them as much as possible as if they were endogenous. It is not, 
that is, supposed by Ackerman that the activities of the State may 
determine a change in the preferences of the individual –  that, after all, 
clearly would violate the principle of neutrality.47  
                                           
46 This means that there is something else beyond maintaining the swing of 
dialogue. SJLS, p. 322: “I can use neither force nor reason to impose dialogue upon 
you. All I can do is ask my question and await your reply. If you try to stare me 
down and impose brute force upon me, I will act in self– defense. If, instead, you 
answer my questions, I will answer yours, and we will see what we will see. The 
choice is yours. [...] In reflecting on your choice, recall only this: I do not wish, by 
some conversational trick, to induce you to grovel before me in the dust. Liberal 
conversation is not my technique for gaining mastery over you, but a means by 
which we may both achieve a deeper affirmation of ourselves as individuals entitled 
to mutual respect. [...]. Prepared to defend his claim to a limited share of social 
power, each citizen may turn his attention to the fundamental question that none 
can evade: the meaning of his own life. And within a power structure based on 
dialogue, each person may, to the extent he finds it useful, call upon others to 
engage with him in a common search for meaning. The overall pattern of culture 
and life that emerges from this interchange will constantly change over time, as one 
generation builds upon, and criticizes, the work of the last. Over time, however, the 
social life of the liberal State will represent the full range of moral creation that lies 
within the grasp of citizens who confront one another without pretensions to moral 
dominion.”  
47 TAYLOR, M., The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
pp. 164–185, however, has argued that if the structure of social preference cannot 
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For Ackerman skeptical considerations on nature of substantial ends, 
which are related to the epistemological considerations on the neutrality 
made by Ackerman, are correlated with an activist liberal State. Ackerman 
believes that there is a direct link between the arguments in support of 
neutrality and conclusions – on the protection of freedom of speech and 
expression, on environmental policy, on the distribution of wealth between 
generations, and so on – generally accepted  in liberal communities. The 
answers we find to these questions, however, are not internal to our 
community for some contingent reason –  in the sense that they could be let 
to the free judgment of individuals and to the preferences of  social groups. 
For Ackerman they stem from assumptions about neutrality. If they cannot 
be traced back to neutrality, then that means that someone is trying to 
exercise illegitimate power over someone else. This course of action should 
justify a reallocation of resources in an egalitarian sense. But there is a 
hidden assumption in Ackerman, namely that in any situation of ethical 
choice it should be taken a position in favor of a broad moral relativism. 
However, choosing relativism is not a choice implying itself relativism, as 
choosing neutrality do imply  a no– neutral commitment to neutrality. But 
Ackerman still believes that neutralism does not endorse any moral 
judgment of priorities. Ackerman line of argument could be that things are 
precisely so: any claim of superiority should be based on  a privileged access 
to the truth of the ethical–moral judgments, while in reality they are not 
susceptible of proof. Other interpretations of the principle of neutrality that 
lead to nihilistic  consequences are inhibited. These are also excluded, for 
example, by the Hare’s rule–utilitarian Kantianism, according to which all 
candidates for the role of moral principle must be universalizable in the sense 
that they should not contain any reference to particular people and/or 
situations. There is, indeed, more than an analogy between these two species 
of universalism. Few moral philosophers would find it difficult to follow 
Ackerman in rejecting egoism, but he associates this move with the rejection 
of any policy, even those formally universalizable, which he thinks are 
designed to affirm some statement of superiority.  
It would seem, therefore, that the principle of neutrality is reduced to 
the assertion that, since there is nothing that resembles to a kind of moral 
knowledge or moral certainty, we are never justified to prefer a certain 
                                                                                                                            
be changed in the absence of the State, it does not follow that the State is desirable 
even when the individual is not able to formulate the corresponding preference.  
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distribution of manna on the basis of a judgment of superiority of any 
person, action, good, or way of life. This means that there can be no utility 
measurement, no appeal on merit and no limitation placed by antecedent 
moral rights, except for those that are embedded in the rules of the dialogue 
itself. The conclusion is that there is an important normative burden on the 
reasons for holding the principle of neutrality.48 One of the reasons that 
seems to justify the principle of neutrality is Ackerman’s liberal assumption 
that, because of the intrinsic value of the individuals who lives an 
independent life, people should be left free to make their own mistakes. For 
Ackerman it is almost obvious that everyone should be able to follow only 
the path that he/she has chosen without having to answer to others for 
his/her choices, at least since when everyone lives his/her life without 
entering into coercive  interactions with others.49 Without denying that 
there may be other things whose value can be known, Ackerman believes 
that the ability to develop a rational plan of life is the best thing there is and 
that if we want to deny it, we should find a better candidate for individuals 
than developing a plan of life that looks good for him/her. 
But the only extended argument that Ackerman has to defend his 
position is what has been mentioned above, according to which each 
alternative position involves a controversial claim to moral knowledge, 
something that looks like more as a mantra than to an argument. “The hard 
truth is this: There is no moral meaning hidden in the bowels of the universe. 
All there is is you and I struggling in a world that neither we, nor any other 
thing, created. Yet there is not need to be overwhelmed by the void. We may 
create our own meanings, you and I; however transient or superficial, these 
are the only meanings we will ever know. And the first meaningful reality we 
must create–one presupposed by all other acts of meaningful 
communication–is the idea that you and I are persons capable of giving 
meanings to the world.”50 It would seem that only neutral liberal dialogue is 
able to regulate our conflict without destructive outcomes. “Yet this is just 
the achievement of a Neutral conversation. We begin our struggle in silence, 
                                           
48 These reasons are set out briefly in the first chapter and come briefly back again 
in the last of SJLS. 
49 NOZICK, R., Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of 
Ernest Nagel, S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (eds.), St. Martin's Press, 
440–472. 
50 SJLS, p. 317. 
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each of us appropriating what we see in front of us; but soon enough we see 
each other and are faced with the task of giving meaning to our encounter. 
By speaking to one another in a Neutral way, we both succeed in giving our 
struggle a meaningful form. No longer is our conflict interpretable only as a 
blind struggle between two competing forces; instead, we may understand it 
as an affirmation of our capacities to impress our own meanings on the 
world. It is only through such an act of mutual reinforcement that we may 
give a concrete reality to our understanding of ourselves as people capable of 
living a valuable life in a world without a preordained design.”.51 Ackerman 
believes that this can also result from prudential considerations on the 
corruptibility of the human race. Most of us think to know something about 
good life, and just for this there are many good reasons to impose constraints 
on the liberal political conversation. Ackerman in his apparent skepticism is 
closed to Mill’s argument that experimentation is a vital way to progress and 
also to the Kantian perspective that moral goodness is not something that 
can be imposed, because it requires that people act on the basis of their 
moral beliefs. We could assume to believe “that you think you know what 
the good life is and that it is of a kind that can be forced on others; then the 
only question is whether the right people will be doing the forcing. A single 
glance at the world suggests that this is no trivial problem. People adept in 
gaining power are hardly known for their depth of moral insight; the very 
effort to engross power corrupts–at least if your theory of the good embraces 
any number of familiar moral ideals.”52 This assumption on moral autonomy 
must come into play at some relevant point of the practice of dialogue for 
preventing the paternalistic assumption that you have the right to impose 
good if you know it. It is not important to emphasize that Ackerman does 
not unfold some implications of this argument against the paternalism. The 
important issue is that Ackerman does not think necessary to appeal to the 
idea of autonomy as a condition for treating the person as a responsible 
agent, who must answers for his/her actions. This is strange and this 
anomaly can perhaps be explained this way: if autonomy takes the centre 
stage it would mean to bind it to controversial assumptions on worthiness of 
the actions; but this would be equivalent of making a value judgment on 
actions, which seems not to be allowed in the ideal of neutral dialogue. 
However, this assumption on moral autonomy must come into play at some 
                                           
51 SJLS, p. 317. 
52 SJLS, pp. 18. 
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relevant point of the practice of dialogue, just to prevent the paternalistic 
assumption that you have the right to impose your own vision of good if you 
believe you have relevant knowledge about it. 
Even the repeated statement of the equal value of liberal citizens –  that 
you cannot claim to know that you are better than I am –  hides more than a 
few ambiguities, since it is not clear whether Ackerman refers to the ethical 
quality of the parties –  for example, the same disposition to dialogue –or to 
the fact that they are capable of pursuing a rational plan of life (the attempt 
to give meaning to their lives, which would constitute the fundamental 
question of the humankind). The prohibition to  agree to a universal form of 
living that is evaluated as morally superior to another, it is more an anti–
paternalistic than a skeptical ideal of conduct. Liberal dialogue does not 
have as inevitable outcome an unnerving and exhausting loop. If we were 
coherent skeptical, we should give up any distributive ideal. Since it would 
not be possible to argue for or against different distributions, it would not be 
possible to assign different amounts of goods to accomplish those purposes 
and, therefore, each would be entitled to groped to grab as much as possible. 
Ackerman, on the contrary, believes that the assumption of equality is 
positive, normative and substantive, and this assumption affects in a very 
decisive way final outcomes in distributive justice. All the actors are in fact 
entitled to make questions of legitimacy on scarce resources on the basis of 
the same principle, namely, that their life has the same value as any other 
else. Therefore, if it were possible to come back to an initial situation, 
everyone would be entitled to an equal portion of the resources. Ackerman is 
moved to this by the optimistic belief that even if this distribution does not 
make everyone able to get what he/she wants, it will be a distribution that 
will have the advantage of being viable and to go through the test of liberal 
dialogue. Of course all this only when we have made the voluntaristic choice 
in favor of liberal dialogue, an option that must be continually iterated and 
the result of which, incidentally, is not guaranteed and betting  on the 
assumption that this choice will give the best opportunity to the citizens to 
build a world of meanings. “But, once again, all this can be denied. If there is 
no master design, the challenge is to transcend all talk of good and evil and 
master the universe. If God is dead, everything is permitted. But are you 
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willing to say this? Even if you are, will the charismatic superman fare any 
better with bureaucratic realities than the philosopher–king”53 
It is not, however, sure that the neutrality can be effective without a 
strong and obvious skeptical tendency. Being possible to enforce skepticism 
to our choices, we may ask how can we ever be sure that the research and the 
realization of our own good will be on the same level with any other plan of 
life? Ackerman believes that individuals are willing to accept that there are 
differences in the value of lifestyle they adopt. He must insist on the fact 
that there are no gradients to assess and compare these different lifestyles, 
but it is this option for a value, however weak, that is the hidden strength of 
his repeated statement that no criticism can be made against equality 
without violating neutrality. With a principle like neutrality, which seems to 
be incompatible, at least in one of its versions, with the development of any 
value judgment, it is clear that everything depends on the point at which we 
are willing to push it. Thus, we can still try to give an interpretation in 
accordance with the egalitarian perspective of Ackerman. When Ackermann 
states that each person taking part to liberal dialogue is supposed to be 
worth at least as much as any other, what is meant by this expression? We 
can think that when citizens that take part to liberal dialogue enter into 
adult life, they are a kind of tabula rasa with regard on merits and demerits, 
and they, therefore, can be represented as generally equal. If you agree with 
this description, then what a person acquires in the course of his life or what 
loses, if it can be proved to be coherent with the rules of liberal dialogue, 
then it is just the results of his/her personal efforts and autonomous choices. 
The remaining inequalities would be justified within a structure of 
egalitarian opportunity. This move is understandable on the background of 
the anti–utilitarian assumption that bans a single gradient for the 
measurement of assets, for which Ackerman seems to have avoided the 
pitfall of having established an equivalence between equal opportunity and 
equal satisfaction. However, this possibility is measured in relation to the 
satisfaction that equality via neutrality is able to give and this means that 
Ackerman is surreptitiously introducing some criterion of comparison that 
should enable us to establish that the initial situation of equality is better 
than other. 
                                           
53 SJLS, p. 318. For an application of this idea within contemporary political 
liberalism, see The Future of Liberal Revolution, p. 43. 
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On behalf of Ackerman who is speaking? It seems on behalf of those who 
have already accepted the whole structure of liberal dialogue, because it is in 
this structure that the principle of equal satisfaction is rejected since it 
implies to reach the agreement on a differentiated distribution of goods, that 
would therefore violate neutrality. The idea that the equal distribution 
achieves the greatest possible measure of opportunities in a world of scarce 
resources is certainly plausible and consistent with Ackerman’s liberal 
background, but has a number of drawbacks. One is that not all projects 
have the same costs. For some agents, therefore, the initial distribution 
situation will be clearly not a point of balance. These agents may also be 
dissatisfied with the idea of achieving balance in subsequent transactions 
between agents, because this would mean for them extra efforts and failure 
and loss in terms of satisfaction.  
Another difficulty is indicated by the simple fact that it is not clear that 
everyone should have a goal or set of goals by mean of which they are going 
to order their own lives. If we apply this idea to all the inhabitants of liberal 
democracies, we make a gross error of judgment. But even if we are thinking 
hypothetically, it is not clear that being liberal citizens means to devote 
himself/herself to self–realization. It may just mean as well the freedom to 
live as much as possible without clear goals.54  
Even if we were to discover that having a plan of life is a necessary 
condition for being liberal –  which in fact is not – that will not mean that it 
is clear that there must be a general moral agreement on the fact that the 
plan of a person’s life is a good thing, regardless of the content of that plane. 
Therefore Ackerman will always find someone who will object that, since we 
do not have a criterion for distinguishing between good and evil, we are not 
able to make clear and shared assessments of the choices and actions of other 
people. But this is precisely what Ackerman is not willing to accept. And 
from his point of view it is a legitimate choice, in the sense that the moral 
                                           
54 Regarding existing societies, we would then be able to specify what conditions 
must be met for the political community to organize their struggle for power in 
accordance with the epistemology of neutrality. This happens when it is possible to 
ensure that: a) no citizen genetically dominates the other; b) every citizen receives a 
liberal education; c) every citizen starts adult life in the material conditions of 
equality; d) every citizen can freely exchange his/her goods within a flexible 
network of exchanges; e) every citizen, at the time of his/her death, can be said to 
have fulfilled his/her obligations if the he/she delivery to the next generation a 
society no less liberal than that in which he has lived.  
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autonomy, that allows us to operate those options that he weighs positively 
–  to choose our own rational plan of life – , only makes sense against the 
background of correlative intuition that there are limits to the range of 
choices that are open to the liberal citizen. The priority of the dialogue on 
substantive choices is just a mask for drawing the limits of allowed behaviors 
in a liberal society, and these limitations design that priority. Violence, 
deceit, lies and, in general, the anti–social behavior are rightly deemed 
incompatible with participation in neutral dialogue and therefore 
unacceptable. But this is a completely implausible and indirect way of 
excluding immoral and anti–social behaviors. Must we exclude violence and 
torture for the sake of fun simply because they interfere with neutral 
dialogue?55 Can this be a sufficient reason? If that were the case, then neutral 
dialogue could not go ahead without an explicit prohibition against certain 
forms of violence, and this obviously does not need to happen if not for 
moral reasons that are previously asserted.56  
 Dialogic principles, especially equality and undominated neutrality 
should supervise on justice in transactions between individuals. However, 
even if we lived in an ideal society governed exclusively by the liberal 
dialogue we should “Consider the likely position of the parental generation 
when it lets go. While in the beginning a material equality prevailed among 
an undominated citizenry, in the end there will be a great disparity in 
personal histories. Some will have used the transactional system to gain 
enormous wealth; others will die with nothing but their name. Some with 
few material possessions will exercise great moral leadership in one or 
                                           
55 Why do we have the intuition that torturing innocents for fun is wrong in every 
possible world? It is not, maybe, because torturing innocents violates liberal 
dialogue, since we can imagine worlds where it is not morally wrong not to practice 
the dialogue as it is described by Ackerman. On the problem of moral intuitions see 
BENNET, J., The Necessity of Moral Judgement, “Ethics”, 103, 1993, pp. 458– 472. 
56 The suspicion that Ackerman is continually forced to assume that the dialogue 
has a substantive aim emerges from the idea that we can limit the participation to 
our liberal community also against anyone who is willing to practice liberal 
dialogue but currently does not participate in our community. This is tantamount 
to admitting that citizens are entitled to an equal share of manna only if they are 
able to defend their claims and only if they are already members of that same 
community. But the reasoning is not circular, unless the option for the dialogue in a 
community is not also a choice for the preservation of order, that is a form of 
protection and exclusion. So, what could we say to those who ask us for becoming 
part of our community? Can neutrality rationally explain this exclusion? 
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another community; others will amass material fortunes to find themselves 
the objects of widespread contempt. Still others are solitary and poor–some 
brutish, some wise. As this multitude nears death, most will wish to 
influence the future in a way each thinks good.”57 In this ideal world 
recriminations on the final distributions are not possible –  provided, of 
course, that they fail to demonstrate that at some point the structure of 
liberal dialogue has been violated. All this presupposes a complete 
technology of justice and full information for the parties involved in the 
transactions, things beyond our ability. Things in our real world go on in a 
very different way. Existing inequalities simply cannot be justified from the 
point of view of liberal dialogue. 
Conditions of inequality bind, according to Ackerman, the activism of 
the liberal State –  how else, I wonder, if not from an ethical point of view? 
In fact, when inequalities and externalities focus on individuals and 
particular groups, Ackerman believes that his scheme would require and 
justify a vigorous work of redistribution of wealth to get closer to that 
transcendental and archimedean point, in which only makes sense to talk 
about fully informed free choices for agents. But inequalities and 
exploitative situations are, in fact, more than one and it is not clear which 
order of priority should be set for reducing them, without violating 
neutrality. Choosing which of the possible priorities will better serve the 
cause of liberal dialogue, implies a strong consensus on the normative core 
behind the dialogue itself.  
In these circumstances it is not believable, as dictated by Ackerman, 
that the principle of neutrality will give us the rule that compensate the 
abandonment of the neglected idea of the idea of fundamental rights, 
achieving the fulfillment of the dialogic community. “The first stage 
involves the selection of a budget that prima facie serves as the best 
approximation of liberal ideals. The process may be analogized to a 
mathematical problem in constrained maximization. The constraint is the 
idea of equal sacrifice: since everyone is at least as good as everyone else, no 
one can be called upon to sacrifice more of his ideal rights than anyone else. 
Within this constraint, the statesman’s task is to choose the budget that best 
fulfills the liberal ideal of undominated equality.”58 However, it is far from 
being clear that this exclusion can be decided on the basis of a neutral 
                                           
57 SJLS, cit., p. 277. 
58 SJLS, p. 225. 
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procedure. Neutrality is indeed bound by something that is not neutral, but 
it is a value to pursue or to be maximized. And saying this is the way to open 
a selective procedure for some values at the expense of others, in this case 
towards the presumed consent of the citizens to certain forms of distribution 
that seem better to encourage the practice of dialogue as the way to exercise 
of autonomy and free will for fully informed citizens. 
Ackerman is aware that the emphasis on the idea of will highlights the 
most significant point of contact between his dialogism and rawlsian 
contractualism. “In protecting any relationship that is the product of a free 
exchange between consenting adults, ideal liberal theory attempts a 
rapprochement with voluntarist ideas central to the contractarian tradition. 
Nonetheless, differences remain. Most important, my theory does not deal in 
the imagined consent accorded by primitives emerging from a prepolitical 
state of nature hypothesized by classic writers. Nor do I join Rawls in 
appealing to a hypothetical consent said to be forthcoming from citizens who 
have stripped themselves of self– identity and all understanding of their 
particular social situation. Rather than making a metaphor of consent, ideal 
theory focuses upon the explicit agreements made by flesh and blood people 
on the basis of their particular insights into the concrete opportunities that 
social life affords them. Rather than imagining that all citizens assent to a 
uniform social compact, ideal theory permits adults to enter diverse forms of 
consensual community that best express their particular ideals. Yet, for all 
this, liberal theory retains an affinity with contractualist concerns–at least if 
the core of this tradition is an insistence that the forms of social life be 
rooted in the self– conscious value affirmations of autonomous 
individuals.”59 This is the reason why the interpretation of the dialogue in a 
procedural way is quite incomplete, as happens with Rawls’s principles: 
“Thus, Nozick tries to specify principles of fraud and duress as if this effort 
had nothing to do with the principles regulating other dimensions of the 
power struggle; Rawls returns the compliment by restricting his principles of 
justice to something called the ‘basic structure’, specifically exempting all 
issues involving the fairness of particular transactions. In contrast, the 
dialogic principles regulating free exchange are an inextricable part of a 
larger liberal theory of social justice. Without transactional flexibility, a 
liberal State cannot defend the property system–be it individualist or 
                                           
59 SJLS, pp. 173, where Ackerman shows a remarkable misunderstanding of 
Rawls’s position, emphasizing his alleged lack of interest in the actual agreements. 
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collectivist–under which initial claims to material wealth are distributed. If 
a citizen has obtained a transactional advantage over his fellows, he must 
respond to the same question of legitimacy that confronts the holders of 
genetic, educational, or material advantage. Rather than drawing an 
arbitrary limitation on the scope of its principles of legitimacy, liberal 
dialogue governs all dimensions of the power struggle–whether they concern 
micro– interactions between two individuals or macro– dealings between 
generations”.60 This is what justifies the idea of an intervention of the liberal 
State to correct the most obvious injustices, that for Ackerman seem to 
identify in the limitations  – informative, due to competition from free 
riders, or to the prevalence of externalities limiting inefficiently the free 
choice of liberal agents – of free exchange between citizens.61 In order for this 
to happen “On the level of policy, this attitude will be reflected in a 
continuing insistence that the claims of free contract be appraised against 
the background of power relationships established by the transactional 
framework and the distribution of wealth, education, and ability. On the 
philosophical level, the liberal can have the courage to question the doubtful 
notion that a promise, once fairly made, must always be kept. Freed from 
the emphatic certainties about the self and time implicit in the 
contractarian’s position, he can permit himself to wonder about these 
mysteries without discrediting the master concept organizing liberal 
thought.”62 All these qualifications are strictly tied for Ackerman with the 
central idea of  voluntary free exchange  as a mean for the approximation to 
ideal equality and neutrality. But for creating approximately similar 
conditions to a situation of ideal exchange the State is forced to continuous 
corrective interference – without guarantees that unjust inequalities will not 
appear again in the near future.  
The idea of an always  voluntary free trade transaction is, therefore, a 
regulative idea in our world, where imperfections of present societies would 
seem to overwhelm and deny the promised freedom of an ideal world of 
                                           
60 SJLS, p. 172. 
61 For example, if the demands of an ideal system of transitions are not met in some 
significant part, then the person who is being treated unfairly has the right to 
request a State intervention that helps to approximate the results that would be 
achieved in a ideal exchange network (SJLS, pp. 348– 352). 
62 SJLS, p. 274 It should be taken into account that when there were inequalities in 
the acquisition of assets, or defects in liberal education or serious genetic handicaps, 
then the assumption of a mutual negotiation without restrictions is not possible.  
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equal starting points and perfect mechanisms of exchange. What does 
remain in our world of the liberal commitment to the voluntary agreement if 
not its strong ethical endorsement, also in Ackerman with all its kantian 
halo? 
Dialogism is the tentative shaping of mechanisms of competition 
between social actors. It is both a rationalization and a justification, an 
ethical arché, and a moral telos. Its practical significance should lead us to 
conclude that since our real situation is one in which are predominant 
conditions of imperfect information, where market does not comply with the 
conditions of dialogue, then we would be entitled, from a moral point of 
view, not to follow the normal bonds that give content to the actual social 
contracts. According to the neutralist methodology, which is only the other 
face of a dialogical ethics, where the markets are imperfect and 
communications are inadequate, the damaged actors would, therefore, have 
the possibility not to apply the obligations of a contract simply by referring 
to alternative gains that they could obtain under other conditions, that are 
supposed to be closer to those ideals. But this would bring us back, if it could 
really happen, to a situation near to a hobbesian state of nature, from which 
it would be very hard to earn back the conditions of liberal dialogue. 
This does not happen in Ackerman because it is assumed that this 
rapprochement between real and ideal is the ethical task of the liberal 
citizen, as an asymptotic approximation and an infinite task, which can be 
justified only by consensus on a normative core and with a strong 
commitment in favor of a communitarian ethics. The principle of equal 
sacrifice, which ensures that deviations from perfectly liberals conditions are 
distributed in equal parts, can only be a weak gimmick, because it assumes 
what it is to prove, namely, that parties and actors have an equal interest or 
an equal ethical motivation to reach a situation of undominated equality 
through the iteration of dialogical performance. 
Ackerman believes that each group must develop these issues in the light 
of their own circumstances and conceptions of the good, because his theory 
only provides a framework within which the concerns of traditional 
doctrines can be reformulated and refined.63  
But what Ackerman adds is a faith in free trade on the basis that it 
encourages individual to see himself/herself as an achiever of goals and to 
pursue his/her own conception of the good. One could always think that 
                                           
63 SJLS, pp. 271– 274. 
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allowing our real transactions on a background of injustice  means favoring 
certain groups or certain individuals, violating neutrality. So the choice for a 
non–ideal society –  our liberal–democratic society–  is discriminatory 
precisely in the sense that Ackerman should avoid on the basis of dialogical 
constraints, and can be effective because consensus, virtual and tacit, is the 
reality that structures our liberal community previously to any pure 
procedures, which, in Ackerman as in Rawls, are instead the foundation of 
liberal political order as an ethical space. 
 
